paper · Online publication: December 2025
Treaty-Following AI
Proposes treaty-constrained AI agents as a commitment mechanism for international cooperation.
Matthijs M. Maas and Tobi Olasunkanmi’s December 2025 article proposes agents that follow their principals’ instructions except where those would breach a designated AI-guiding treaty.[1]
What it adds
Treaty-Following AI makes an international obligation part of an agent’s operating constraints. If feasible, that could help states make credible commitments about deployed agents.[1]
The proposed implementation checks planned goals and actions against treaty provisions before proceeding. The authors identify fragile legal reasoning, unfaithful reasoning traces, Alignment Faking and verification across deployments as obstacles.[1]
“the TFAI framework remains dependent on further technical research into embedding more durable controls on model behaviour”
— Section III.B.3(a). This qualification limits the proposal’s promise of reliable compliance.[1]
What remains open
Legal interpretation, technical verification, political acceptance, and enforcement remain unresolved. The article proposes a framework, not an implemented system guaranteeing compliance. Compare Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the Algorithmic Social Contract for a different approach to collective governance.
Evidence inspected
Review covered the original web article’s abstract, definitions, caveats, implementation and technical challenges, deployment-verification discussion, and conclusion. Its legal authorities and every supporting study were not independently audited.
Historical context
The Institute for Law & AI dates Maas and Olasunkanmi’s research article to December 2025. Month precision preserves the date provided by the original record.[1]
See Treaty-Following AI.
Sources
- Treaty-Following AI · Source record src-071 · Back to claim ↑1 ↑2 ↑3 ↑4 ↑5
Pages that link here
- Key Papers: A Reading Guide note
- Treaty-Following AI concept
Last updated 2026-10-08